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THE STATUS OF POLYCYCLIC GROUP-BASED
CRYPTOGRAPHY: A SURVEY AND OPEN PROBLEMS
JONATHAN GRYAK AND DELARAM KAHROBAEI
Abstract. Polycyclic groups are natural generalizations of cyclic groups but
with more complicated algorithmic properties. They are finitely presented and
the word, conjugacy, and isomorphism decision problems are all solvable in
these groups. Moreover, the non-virtually nilpotent ones exhibit an exponen-
tial growth rate. These properties make them suitable for use in group-based
cryptography, which was proposed in 2004 by Eick and Kahrobaei [10].
Since then, many cryptosystems have been created that employ polycyclic
groups. These include key exchanges such as non-commutative ElGamal, au-
thentication schemes based on the twisted conjugacy problem, and secret shar-
ing via the word problem. In response, heuristic and deterministic methods
of cryptanalysis have been developed, including the length-based and linear
decomposition attacks. Despite these efforts, there are classes of infinite poly-
cyclic groups that remain suitable for cryptography.
The analysis of algorithms for search and decision problems in polycyclic
groups has also been developed. In addition to results for the aforementioned
problems we present those concerning polycyclic representations, group mor-
phisms, and orbit decidability. Though much progress has been made, many
algorithmic and complexity problems remain unsolved; we conclude with a
number of them. Of particular interest is to show that cryptosystems using
infinite polycyclic groups are resistant to cryptanalysis on a quantum com-
puter.
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1. Introduction
In cryptography, many of the most common key exchange protocols, including
RSA and Diffie-Hellman, rely upon hardness assumptions related to integer factor-
ization and discrete logarithms for their security. While there are no known efficient
algorithms for performing the above operations on conventional computers, Peter
Shor devised a quantum algorithm [39] that solves both of these problems in polyno-
mial time. This has motivated the search for alternative methods for constructing
cryptosystems. One such methodology is non-commutative cryptography, which
unlike the aforementioned conventional systems does not operate over the integers.
Instead, non-commutative cryptographic systems are built upon groups and other
algebraic structures whose underlying operations are non-commutative.
. In 1999, Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld [1] and Ko, Lee, et al. [25] introduced key
exchange protocols whose security is based in part on the conjugacy search problem:
for a group G, given that u, v ∈ G are conjugate, find an x in G such that ux = v.
Though braid groups were the suggested platform for both protocols, other classes
of groups can be employed. In general, groups suitable for use in non-commutative
cryptography must be well-known and possess the following properties: a solvable
word problem, a computationally difficult group-theoretic problem, a “fast” word
growth rate, and the namesake non-commutativity [33].
. In 2004, Eick and Kahrobaei [10] investigated the algorithmic properties of poly-
cyclic groups. In particular, they explored how the time complexity of the word
and conjugacy problems varied with respect to a group’s Hirsch length. Their ex-
periments showed that the while the time complexity of the conjugacy problem
grew exponentially with increased Hirsch length, the word problem remained effi-
ciently solvable. These results suggested the suitability of polycyclic groups for use
in cryptography, and stimulated research into cryptosystems based on these groups
and their underlying algorithmic problems.
. In this paper, we survey the development of group-based cryptography over poly-
cyclic and metabelian groups. In section 2 we discuss the algorithmic properties of
polycyclic groups. Polycyclic groups and their intrinsic presentations are defined,
as well as several other representations. A number of group-theoretic decision
problems are introduced, including the word, conjugacy, and isomorphism decision
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problems. Note that in every polycyclic group, the three aforementioned problems
are solvable. Moreover, the word problem can be solved efficiently in most cases by
using a collection algorithm.
. In section 3 we describe a number of cryptosystems that have been built around
these groups. These include additional key exchanges along with schemes for se-
cret sharing, authentication, and digital signatures. This variety of cryptosystems
evinces the flexibility and utility of polycyclic groups in non-commutative cryptog-
raphy.
. As new cryptosystems are created, so too are their dual in the form of crypt-
analyses and attacks. In section 4 we discuss the length-based attack, a heuristic
technique that was the first to break the AAG protocol over braid groups. Other
attacks exploit the linear representation that all polycyclic groups admit. Some,
such as the field-based attack, are specific to a subclass of polycyclic groups. A
more general approach is the linear decomposition attack, but its feasibility is de-
pendent upon the size of a group’s representation.
. We conclude the paper with the current status of polycyclic groups cryptography.
We also include a list of open problems, which we hope will guide researchers who
wish to work in this exciting field.
2. Algorithmic Problems in Polycyclic Groups
The nature of polycyclic groups enables them to be represented in several ways.
These approaches give rise to complementary algorithms for solving search and
decisions problems, with varying degrees of computational complexity. Due to this
flexibility, we begin our study of the algorithmic problems in polycyclic groups by
examining these representations.
2.1. Representations of Polycyclic Groups.
2.1.1. Polycyclic Sequences and Hirsch Length. A group G is said to be polycyclic
if it has a subnormal series G = G1 ⊲ · · ·⊲Gn+1 = {1} such that the quotient groups
Gi/Gi+1 are cyclic. This series is called a polycyclic series. The Hirsch length of a
polycyclic group G is the number of infinite groups in its polycyclic series. Though
a polycyclic group can have more than one polycyclic series, as a consequence of
the Schreier Refinement Theorem, its Hirsch length is independent of the choice of
series.
2.1.2. Polycyclic Presentations. Every polycyclic group can be described by a poly-
cyclic presentation:
〈g1, . . . , gn | g
gi
j = uij for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
g
g
−1
i
j = vij for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
grii = wii for i ∈ I〉,
where uij , vij , wii are words in the generators gi+1, . . . , gn and I is the set of indices
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ri = [Gi : Gi+1] is finite.
This special type of finite presentation reveals the polycyclic structure of the un-
derlying group, see [20, Chapter 10] for details. Unlike general finite presentations,
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a polycyclic presentation enables the word problem to be solved using an algorithm
called collection. The collection algorithm is generally effective in practical ap-
plications, but its precise computational complexity remains unknown. For finite
groups, collection from the left was shown to be polynomial by Leedham-Green and
Soicher [27]. For infinite groups, the complexity of the collection algorithm and a
modified version were analyzed by Gebhardt [16]. The resultant worst-case bound
is in terms of the absolute values of all exponents occurring during the collection
process, rather than the exponents of the input word. Thus a global complexity
analysis of the collection algorithm remains elusive.
2.1.3. Polycyclic Presentations with a Malcev Basis. It has been shown by Ass-
mann and Linton [2] that the efficacy of the collection algorithm can be improved
significantly by exploiting the Malcev structure of the underlying group. This ap-
proach determines a large nilpotent normal subgroup of the given group and then
exploits the Malcev correspondence for the normal subgroup. There is no known
complexity analysis for this methodology.
2.1.4. Polycyclic Presentations with Multiplication Polynomials. Du Sautoy [8] proved
that every polycyclic group has a normal subgroup of finite index such that mul-
tiplication in this subgroup can be achieved by evaluating certain multiplication
polynomials. This extends the well-known result by Hall [19] for torsion-free nilpo-
tent polycyclic groups. If such multiplication polynomials are available the perfor-
mance of collection in the considered group improves significantly. Additionally, it
provides a basis for the complexity analysis of multiplication in polycyclic groups;
it must be noted however that the index of the normal subgroup can be arbitrarily
large.
2.1.5. Matrix Groups. It is well-known that every polycyclic group can be embed-
ded into GL(n,Z) for some n ∈ N. For groups that are additionally torsion-free
and nilpotent, a matrix representation can be computed. The algorithm of Lo and
Ostheimer [28] can be applied to a polycyclic presentation, while for multiplication
polynomials the technique by Nickel [35] can be utilized. Multiplication of group
elements in their matrix form is polynomial in the dimension n of the representa-
tion.
2.2. Growth Rate.
. Let G be a finitely generated group. The growth rate of a group is specified by
its growth function γ : N −→ R defined as γ(n) = #{w ∈ G : l(w) ≤ n}, where
l(w) is the length of w as a word in the generators of G. As words are used as keys
in group-based cryptography, there is a natural relationship between the growth
rate of a group and the key space, the set of all possible keys. A fast growth rate
engenders a large key space, making an exhaustive search of this space intractable.
A large class of polycyclic groups are known to have an exponential growth rate
(namely those which are not virtually nilpotent, see Wolf [46] and Milnor [30]).
Consequently, these polycyclic groups are potentially good candidates for use as
platform groups.
2.3. Decision Problems.
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. In 1911, Max Dehn introduced [7] three decision problems on finitely presented
groups - the word problem, the conjugacy problem, and the isomorphism problem.
In the definitions below, let G be a finitely presented group:
• Word Decision Problem - For any g ∈ G, determine if g = 1G, the identity
element of G.
• Single Conjugacy Decision Problem - Determine for any u, v ∈ G if u is
conjugate to v (denoted u ∼ v).
• Isomorphism Decision Problem - Given groups G and G′ with respective
finite presentations 〈X | R〉 and 〈X ′ | R′〉, determine if G is isomorphic to
G′.
For polycyclic groups all three of the above problems are decidable. The conju-
gacy decision problem for polycyclic groups is decidable by the results of Remeslen-
nikov [36] and Formanek [13]. That the word problem is decidable can be observed
from its formulation as a special case of the conjugacy decision problem (where
g = u, v = 1G), or by observing that every word has a unique normal form induced
by a polycyclic presentation. The isomorphism decision problem for polycyclic
groups is solvable by a result of Segal [38].
An additional decision problem called the subgroup membership decision prob-
lem (alternatively the generalized word decision problem) asks for any g ∈ G and
subgroup H ≤ G, determine if g ∈ H . Malcev in [29] showed that this problem is
indeed solvable for polycyclic groups.
2.4. The Conjugacy Search Problem and its Variations.
. Once the solvability of a group-theoretic decision problem is affirmed, the sub-
sequent task is to produce elements (or morphisms, etc.) that are solutions to
particular instances of it. The seminal protocols of non-commutative cryptogra-
phy, Ko-Lee and AAG, are based in part on the conjugacy search problem (CSP).
Their example spurred the development of many other protocols whose security is
based on some variant of the CSP. In this section we explore these variations and
the methods designed to solve them.
2.4.1. Conjugacy Search Problem. Let G be a group and a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn el-
ements of it, with ai ∼ bi. The problem of finding a c ∈ G such that for all i,
aci = bi is called the (single) conjugacy search problem for i = 1 and the multiple
conjugacy search problem for 1 < i ≤ n. In polycyclic groups, the multiple con-
jugacy search problem for n elements reduces to n independent solutions of single
conjugacy search [10]. We will therefore speak only of the conjugacy search problem
without signifying arity.
For any finitely presented group (polycyclic groups included) the conjugacy
search problem can be solved exhaustively by recursively enumerating the con-
jugates of the element in question [40]. There are other approaches to solving the
conjugacy search problem, many of which can solve it efficiently. However, the ap-
plicability of these methods and their relative efficiency is contingent upon addition
restrictions on the group’s properties, as well as the manner is which the polycyclic
group is specified.
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2.4.2. CSP Using Polycyclic Presentations. For infinite polycyclic groups the algo-
rithm proposed by Eick and Ostheimer [11] is applicable. This algorithm uses a
variety of ideas: it exploits finite orbit and stabilizer computations, calculations in
number fields, and linear methods for polycyclic groups. The algorithm has been
implemented and seems to be efficient for groups of small Hirsch length. An analy-
sis of the algorithm’s complexity is hindered by there being no bound on the length
of the finite orbits that may occur in the computation.
The restriction of the applicability of the above algorithm to groups of small
Hirsch length is supported by the experimental evidence provided by Eick and
Kahrobaei in [10]. They compared the performance of the Eick-Ostheimer algorithm
for the CSP against the collection algorithm for polycyclic groups of the form G =
OK⋊UK , where OK and UK are respectively the maximal order and group of units
of an algebraic number field K. In the table below, the column H(G) is the Hirsch
length of the group G, with the collection and conjugation entries representing the
average running time over 100 trials using random words (respectively, random
conjugate pairs) from G:
H(G) Collection Conjugation
2 0.00 sec 9.96 sec
6 0.01 sec 10.16 sec
14 0.05 sec >100 hr
These results suggest that while collection remains efficient as the Hirsch length
increases, the Eick-Ostheimer algorithm becomes impractical. Presently there are
no known algorithms for infinite polycyclic groups of high Hirsch length. Such
groups remain suitable for use as platform groups.
2.4.3. CSP Using Multiplication Polynomials. Suppose that G instead is given by
a polycyclic presentation with multiplication polynomials. Let g1, . . . , gk be the
polycyclic generating set of the presentation and consider a generic element g =
gx11 · · · g
xk
k of G. g is a solution to the multiple conjugacy search problem if and
only if aig = gbi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If ai = g
li1
1 · · · g
lik
k and bi = g
mi1
1 · · · g
mik
k , with
f1, . . . , fk denoting the multiplication polynomials for G, then aig = gbi if and only
if
fj(li, x) = fj(mi, x) for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k.
If f1, . . . , fk are given as explicit polynomials over an extension field of Q and li,mi
are integer vectors, then the CSP is equivalent to determining an integer solution
for a set of k polynomials in k indeterminates. Thus the CSP can also be considered
from the perspective of algebraic geometry.
2.4.4. Power Conjugacy Search Problem. The key exchange presented in Section
3.3.2 makes use of the power conjugacy search problem, where if it is known for
some a, b ∈ G and n ∈ N that an = bg for some g ∈ G, the task is to find one such
n and g. Note that for n = 1 this reduces to the standard CSP, whereas if g = 1G
this reduces to the power search problem.
Just as the conjugacy search problem is solvable by enumeration, so is the power
conjugacy search variant, but no efficient algorithm is known.
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2.4.5. Twisted Conjugacy Search Problem. Twisted conjugacy arises in Nielsen the-
ory, where the number of twisted conjugacy classes is related to number of fixed
points of a mapping. The twisted conjugacy search problems is to find, given a group
G and an endomorphism φ, an element a ∈ G such that t = a−1wφ(a), provided
that at least one such a exists.
The standard CSP can be seen as a special case of the twisted version where
φ(x) = x, the identity automorphism. The protocol by Shpilrain and Ushakov in
Section 3.6 uses the double twisted conjugacy variant, in which the above definitions
is modified to include an additional endomorphism α and the task is to then find
an element a ∈ G such that t = α(a−1)wφ(a).
The twisted conjugacy decision problem was proven to be decidable by Ro-
man’kov [37]. Both the single and doubly twisted conjugacy search problems are
solvable by the same method of enumeration as in the case of the standard conju-
gacy search problem. However, no efficient algorithm is known.
2.5. Properties of Automorphism Groups. The automorphism group Aut(G)
and its subgroups have been extensively studied for polycyclic groups G. Like
polycyclic groups themselves, Aut(G) is finitely presented [3], and the outer auto-
morphism group Out(G) is isomorphic to a linear group [45].
A decision problem related to Aut(G) is the orbit decision problem. Given ele-
ments g, h ∈ G and a subset A ⊆ Aut(G), determine if there exists α ∈ A such that
g = α(h). Note that if A = Inn(G) this problem reduces to the standard conjugacy
decision problem. When G is polycyclic all cyclic subgroups A ≤ Aut(G) are orbit
decidable [5].
For groups G in the larger class of polycyclic-by-finite (or virtually polycyclic)
groups, the conjugacy decision problem is decidable in Aut(G) [38]. Additionally,
Aut(G) is either virtually polycyclic or it contains a non-abelian free subgroup [9].
2.6. Quantum Algorithms.
. As mentioned in the introduction, the introduction non-commutative cryptogra-
phy was spurred by the publication of Shor’s algorithm. The algorithm enables a
sufficiently sized quantum computer to perform integer factorization and compute
discrete logs in polynomial time, as opposed to in exponential time on a conven-
tional computer.
From a group-theoretic perspective, Shor’s algorithm can be seen as solving the
hidden subgroup problem in finite cyclic groups. A subgroup H ≤ G is considered
hidden by a function f from G to a set X if it constant over all cosets of H . A
2003 paper by [4] by Batty, et al. explores this and other applications of quantum
algorithms to group theory, including an algorithm by Watrous that determines the
order of a finite solvable group. Bonanome showed [6] that a modified version of
Grover’s algorithm can solve the automorphism and conjugacy decision problems
in finite groups, as well as determine fixed points. The algorithm by Ivanyos, et
al [22] solves the hidden subgroup problem for finite nilpotent groups of class 2.
There are also partial results to solving the power conjugacy problem [12].
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Despite these developments in the use quantum algorithms for finite groups,
there are no known quantum algorithms that are applicable to infinite groups.
3. Cryptosystems
For the systems described below, the chosen platform group G should be suitable
for cryptography as delineated in the introduction. Let G be finitely presented and
non-abelian. Group operations (products, inverses) and solving the word problem
must be efficient. Additional criteria for each protocol or scheme are stated in their
respective descriptions. Note that the precise definitions of each algorithmic search
or decision problem can be found in Section 2.
3.1. The Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld Key-Exchange Protocol. In their 1999
paper [1], Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld introduced the commutator key exchange
protocol, which is also referred to as AAG key exchange or Arithmetica. The group-
based version of the key exchange described below is in the style of [31]. Prior to the
key exchange, the protocol parameters N1, N2, L1, L2, L ∈ N, with 1 ≤ L1 ≤ L2,
are chosen and made public:
(1) Alice chooses a set A¯ = {a1, . . . , aN1}, with Bob choosing B¯ = {b1, . . . , bN2},
where ai, bj ∈ G are words of length in [L1, L2]. Note that A¯ and B¯ both
generate subgroups of G. These sets are then exchanged publicly with each
other.
(2) Alice constructs her private key as A = aǫ1s1 . . . a
ǫL
sL
, with ask ∈ A¯ and
ǫk ∈ {−1, 1}. Similarly, Bob computes as his private key B = b
δ1
t1
. . . bδLtL ,
with btk ∈ B¯ and δk ∈ {−1, 1}.
(3) Alice then computes b′j = A
−1bjA for 1 ≤ j ≤ N2 and sends this collection
to Bob, while Bob computes and sends Alice a′i = B
−1aiB for 1 ≤ i ≤ N1.
(4) Alice and Bob can now compute a shared key κ = A−1B−1AB, which is
the commutator of A and B, denoted [A,B]. Alice computes (using only
the a′i which correspond to some si of her private key):
κA = A
−1a′
ǫ1
s1
· · ·a′
ǫL
sL
= A−1B−1aǫ1s1B · · ·B
−1aǫLsLB
= A−1B−1aǫ1s1(BB
−1)aǫ2s2B · · ·B
−1aǫL−1sL−1(BB
−1)aǫLsLB
= A−1B−1aǫ1s1a
ǫ2
s2
· · · aǫL−1sL−1a
ǫL
sL
B
= A−1B−1AB.
Analogously, Bob computes κB = B
−1A−1BA. The shared secret is then
κ = κA = κ
−1
B .
As noted in [41], the security of AAG is based on both the simultaneous conjugacy
search problem and the subgroup membership search problem.
3.2. Ko-Lee Key Exchange Protocol. Originally specified by Ko, Lee, et al.
[25] using braid groups, their non-commutative analogue of Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change can be generalized to work over other platform groups. Let G be a finitely
presented group, with A,B ≤ G such that all elements of A and B commute.
An element g ∈ G is chosen, and g,G,A,B are made public. A shared secret
can then be constructed as follows:
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• Alice chooses a random element a ∈ A and sends ga to Bob.
• Bob chooses a random element b ∈ B and sends gb to Alice.
• The shared key is then gab, as Alice computes (gb)a, which is equal to Bob’s
computation of (ga)b as a and b commute.
The security of Ko-Lee rests upon solving the conjugacy search problem within
the subgroups A,B.
3.3. Non-Commutative ElGamal Key-Exchange. In the 2006 paper by Kahrobaei
and Khan [23], the authors proposed two adaptations of the ElGamal asymmetric
key encryption algorithm for use in non-commutative groups. Let S, T be finitely
generated subgroups such that all elements of S and T commute. In any exchange,
the triple 〈G,S, T 〉 is made public.
3.3.1. Non-Commutative Key Exchange Using Conjugacy Search.
• Bob chooses s ∈ S as his private key, a random element b ∈ G, and publishes
as his public key the tuple 〈b, c〉, with c = bs.
• To create a shared secret x ∈ G, Alice chooses x and a t ∈ T . Using Bob’s
public key, she publishes 〈h,E〉, with h = bt and E = xc
t
.
• To recover x, Bob first computes hs, which, as elements of S and T com-
mute, yields
hs = (bt)s = (bs)t = ct.
Bob can then calculate x = E(c
t)−1 .
The security of this scheme relies upon the conjugacy search problem in G.
3.3.2. Non-Commutative Key Exchange Using Power Conjugacy Search. By im-
posing the additional requirement that the conjugacy search problem is efficiently
solvable in G, we can now describe a variation of the previous protocol:
• Bob chooses s ∈ S and n ∈ Z as his private key, as well as a random element
b ∈ G, and publishes as his public key 〈v, w〉, with v = gn and w = g−1sg.
Note that wn = (s−1gs)n = s−1gns = s−1vs.
• Alice chooses a shared secret x ∈ G, along with m ∈ Z and t ∈ T , and
publishes 〈h,E〉, with h = t−1wmt and E = x−1t−1vmtx.
• To recover x, Bob first computes E′ = shns−1 = st−1sgmnst, which, as
elements of S and T commute, yields
E′ = t−1vmt.
Knowing that E = x−1E′x, Bob can then solve the conjugacy search prob-
lem to obtain the shared secret x.
The security of this scheme rests upon the power conjugacy search problem in
G.
3.4. Non-Commutative Digital Signature. The following digital signature scheme
was proposed in a paper by Kahrobaei and Koupparis [24]. The platform group G
must be infinite. The scheme uses two functions: f : G → {0, 1}∗, which encodes
elements of the group as binary strings; and H : {0, 1}∗ → G, a collision-resistant
hash function. Using these functions (which are made public along with G), a
message can be signed and verified as follows:
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• Key Generation: The signer first chooses an element g ∈ G, whose central-
izer, the set of elements that commute with g, contains 1G and powers of g
exclusively. The private key consists of s ∈ G and n ∈ N, where n is chosen
to be highly composite. The public key x = gns is then published.
• Signing Algorithm: To sign a message m, the signer chooses a random
element t ∈ G and a random factorization ninj of n, and computes the
following (with || denoting concatenation):
y = gnit
h = H(m||f(y))
α = t−1shy
The signature σ = 〈y, α, nj〉 and the message m are then send to the mes-
sage recipient.
• Verification: To verify, the recipient computes h′ = H(m||f(y)), and ac-
cepts the message as authentic if and only if the following equality holds:
ynjα = xh
′y.
The security of the signature scheme is based on the collision resistance of the
hash function, the conjugacy search problem in G, and the Diffie-Hellman assump-
tion. Moreover, Alice must maintain a public list of previously used factors of n,
and regenerate s and n after a few uses.
3.5. A Key Exchange Using the Subgroup Membership Search Problem.
In [43], Shpilrain and Zapata proposed a public key exchange protocol over rela-
tively free groups. Given a free group Gn of rank n and R E Gn, the quotient
group Gn = Gn/R is relatively free if for any endomorphism ψ of Gn, ψ(R) ≤ R.
The protocol utilizes two types of automorphisms:
• Let {x1, . . . , xn} be the generators of Gn. The Neilsen automorphisms are
defined as:
αj(xi) =
{
x−1i i = j
xi i 6= j
βjk(xi) =
{
xixj i = k
xi i 6= k
• For relatively free groups like Gn, the Nielsen automorphisms form a sub-
group of Aut(Gn) under composition. Elements in this subgroup are called
tame automorphisms. In constructing a private key, the protocol uses both
tame and non-tame automorphisms.
In the key exchange below, let Fn and Fn+m denote the relatively free groups of
rank n and n+m, with respective generating sets {x1, . . . , xn} and
{x1, . . . , xn, xn+1, . . . , xn+m}. Moreover, let F
i
j =
∏
iFj denote the direct product
of i instances of the relatively free group of rank j. Finally, let z(x1, . . . , xn+m) de-
note a word z written in the alphabet {x1, . . . , xn+m}. The exchange then proceeds
as follows:
(1) Alice chooses an automorphism φ ∈ Aut(Fn+m), where φ = τ1 ◦ · · · ◦ τk, a
composition of Nielsen automorphisms and non-tame automorphisms which
are readily invertible. Alice uses φ−1 = τ−1k ◦ · · · ◦ τ
−1
1 as her private
key. For each generator xi of Fn+m, Alice computes the word φ(xi) =
yi(x1, . . . , xn+m). She then computes yˆi, which is the restriction of each
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yi to a word in the generators of Fn. The tuple 〈yˆ1, . . . , yˆn+m〉 is then
published as the public key.
(2) Bob chooses a word w in the subgroup S of Fn+mn+m consisting of words of
the form v = (v1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , vn(x1, . . . , xn), 1, . . . , 1). Thus S ∼= F
n
n ,
and w = (w1(x1, . . . , xn), . . . , wn(x1, . . . , xn)). Using the components of
the public key, Bob encrypts w by replacing each instance of xi in yˆj by wi.
The encrypted tuple φˆ(w) = 〈yˆ1(w1, . . . , wn), . . . , yˆn(w1, . . . , wn)〉 is then
sent to Alice.
(3) Alice applies φ−1 (restricted to Fnn ) component-wise to φˆ(w) to recover w
′,
a unique normal form of w. This w′ is the shared key.
The security of the protocol is two-fold. Decrypting a particular message φˆ(w)
is equivalent to solving the subgroup membership search problem in the subgroup
generated by the public key. To recover the private key, an attacker must recover
the automorphism φ and its inverse from the public image of the generators yˆi,
restricted to the subgroup Fn. Shpilrain and Zapata claim there is no known
method of accomplishing this outside of an exhaustive search of Aut(Fn+m).
The authors suggest free metabelian groups of rank r (with r = 10, n = 8,m = 2)
as platform groups for their protocol. Aside from meeting the standard criteria for
platform groups, these groups have the requisite supply of non-tame automorphisms
and the subgroup membership search problem is known to be super-polynomial in
these groups.
3.6. An Authentication Scheme Based on the Twisted Conjugacy Prob-
lem. In [42], Shpilrain and Ushakov introduced a non-commutative authentication
scheme based on the Fiat-Shamir scheme. The platform group G can in fact be a
semigroup, provided that an antihomomorphism ∗ : G→ G, i.e., (ab)∗ = b∗a∗, ex-
ists. The endomorphism group of G should also be sufficiently large to preclude an
exhaustive search. In the simulation of the protocol below, Alice is authenticating
herself to Bob:
(1) Alice chooses s ∈ G as her private key. She then chooses w, t ∈ G and
endomorphisms φ, ψ such that t = ψ(s∗)wφ(s). The public key 〈φ, ψ,w, t〉
is then published.
(2) The commitment/verification exchange proceeds as follows:
(a) Alice chooses an r ∈ G and computes the commitment u = ψ(r∗)tφ(r),
sending it to Bob.
(b) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
(c) Alice replies with v = r if c = 0, and v = sr otherwise.
(d) Bob verifies the commitment u by computing u′, and accepts if u = u′:
If c = 0, Bob computes u′ = ψ(v∗)tφ(v) = ψ(r∗)tφ(r).
If c = 1, Bob computes u′ = ψ(v∗)tφ(v), where
u′ = ψ((sr)∗)tφ(sr)
= ψ(r∗)ψ(s∗)wφ(s)φ(r)
= ψ(r∗)tφ(r).
Note that the commitment/verification steps must be performed k times to yield
a probability of successful forgery less than 1
2k
. The security of the scheme is based
on the apparent hardness of the double twisted conjugacy search problem.
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3.7. Authentication Schemes Based on Semigroup Actions. Drawing inspi-
ration from the zero-knowledge proof by Feige, Fiat, and Shamir; Grigoriev and
Shpilrain [17] introduced two generic protocol schema based upon (semi)group ac-
tions and provided several concrete examples.
3.7.1. An Authentication Scheme Based on the Endomorphism Problem. One such
instance of their second protocol is based upon the endomorphism problem. While
this scheme can be used with a semigroup or some other algebraic structure, the
structure S must meet several criteria:
• An algorithm exists to determine if function over S is an endomorphism.
If S is specified by a presentation this criterion is satisfied by S having an
efficiently solvable word problem.
• An algorithm exists to determine if function over S is an automorphism of
S.
• The endomorphism search problem in S should be demonstrably NP-hard.
As before, in the protocol exchange below Alice is authenticating herself to Bob:
(1) Alice chooses an endomorphism φ : S → S as her private key. Alice then
chooses elements s, t ∈ S such that t = φ(s). The public key 〈S, s, t〉 is then
published.
(2) The commitment/verification exchange proceeds as follows:
(a) Alice chooses an automorphism ψ and computes the commitment u =
ψ(t), sending it to Bob.
(b) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
(c) Alice replies with v = ψ(t) if c = 0, and v = ψ ◦ φ otherwise.
(d) Bob verifies the commitment u by computing u′:
If c = 0, Bob computes u′ = ψ(t) and accepts if u = u′ and ψ is an
automorphism.
If c = 1, Bob computes u′ = (ψ ◦φ)(s) and accepts if u = u′ and ψ ◦φ
is an endomorphism.
3.7.2. An Authentication Scheme Based on the Group Isomorphism Problem. The
following is a new instance of the first protocol, which requires a class of finitely
presented groups C with the following algorithmic properties:
• The class C must have an efficiently solvable isomorphism decision problem.
• The isomorphism search problem in C should be demonstrably NP-hard.
The protocol exchange is as follows:
(1) Alice chooses two isomorphic groups G1 and G2 from C. Alice then chooses
an isomorphism α : G1 → G2 as her private key, and publishes 〈G1, G2〉.
(2) The commitment/verification exchange proceeds as follows:
(a) Alice chooses a group G ∈ C and an isomorphism β : G→ G1, sending
the commitment G to Bob.
(b) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
(c) Alice replies with γ = α if c = 0, and γ = α ◦ β otherwise.
(d) Bob verifies the commitment G by computing G′ = γG:
If c = 0, Bob accepts if G′ ∼= G1.
If c = 1, Bob accepts if G′ ∼= G2.
For both of the above authentication schemes, the commitment/verification steps
must be performed multiple times to yield a low probability of successful forgery.
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3.8. Secret Sharing Schemes Based on the Word Problem. Habeeb, Kahrobaei,
and Shpilrain [18] proposed two secret sharing schemes for groups whose presenta-
tions satisfy small cancellation conditions. In a (t, n) scheme, the threshold t is the
number of participants that are required to recover the shared secret (created and
disseminated by the “dealer”), with n the total number of participants.
In both schemes, the dealer wishes to share a k-bit integer x that will be repre-
sented as a column vector C ∈ Bk. Prior to initiating the secret sharing, the dealer
chooses groups Gj given by the presentations 〈X |Rj〉, where X is a common gen-
erating set and Rj a unique set of relators for each participant Pj . The generating
set X is then made public. Note that both schemes require secure communication
channels between both the dealer and participants and between the participants
themselves. These secure channels can be achieved using any preferred public key
exchange protocol.
3.8.1. An (n, n)-threshold Scheme. In this scheme, all n participants are required
to reproduce the secret x:
(1) The dealer sends each participant Pj their unique relator set Rj .
(2) The dealer decomposes C into n vectors Cj ∈ B
k such that C =
∑
j Cj .
(3) Each entry ckj of Cj is then encoded as a word wkj ∈ Gj , such that wkj ≡
1Gj if ckj = 1 and wkj 6≡ 1Gj otherwise. The wkjs are then sent to PJ
using an open channel.
(4) For each wkj , participant Pj solves the word problem in Gj and reconstructs
Cj .
(5) The participants can then recover C by summing over all Cjs. Note that a
secure sum protocol can be employed so that the Cjs need not be divulged
to the other participants.
3.8.2. A (t, n)-threshold Scheme. In this scheme, t participants are required to re-
produce the secret x. As in Shamir’s secret sharing, x must be an element in Zp
with p prime, and a polynomial f of degree t− 1 must be chosen by the dealer such
that f(0) = x. The dealer must also choose k-bit integers yj ≡ f(j) (mod p).
(1) The dealer sends each participant Pj their unique relator set Rj .
(2) Each yj has its bits bkj encoded as words wkj ∈ Gj as in the previous
scheme.
(3) For each wkj , participant Pj solves the word problem in Gj , yielding yj.
(4) The participants can then perform polynomial interpolation using the yjs
to recover f . The shared secret x is then revealed by evaluating f(0). If
t ≥ 3, Lagrange interpolation can be employed so that the Bjs need not be
divulged to the other participants.
The security of these schemes is contingent upon the relators RJ being kept secret.
4. Cryptanalysis and Attacks
In this section we present a number of attacks against group-based cryptosys-
tems, with an emphasis on those that are applicable to polycyclic groups.
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4.1. Length-Based Attack. The length-based attack (LBA) is an incomplete, lo-
cal search that attempts to solve the conjugacy search problem (or its generalized
version) by using the length of a word as a heuristic. It was first introduced by
Hughes and Tannenbaum [21] as a means to attack the AAG key exchange protocol
over braid groups. In [15], Garber, Kaplan, Teicher, Tsaban, and Vishne explored
the use of length functions based on the Garside normal form of braid group el-
ements. They demonstrated experimentally that the length-based attack in this
context could break the AAG protocol, albeit inefficiently.
As the length-based attack is an iterative improvement search, it is susceptible to
failing at peaks and plateaux in the search space. In [31], Myasnikov and Ushakov
identified when these peaks occur and were able to make successive refinements to
the algorithm to yield a high success rate.
More recently, the authors of [14] analyzed the LBA against AAG over polycyclic
groups. They found that the success rate of the LBA decreased as the Hirsch length
of the platform group increased. Their version of the LBA, essentially a local beam
search, is presented below:
Algorithm 1 LBA with Memory 2
Initialize S = {(|b′|, b′, 1G)}.
while not time out do
for (|c|, c, x) ∈ S do
Remove (|c|, c, x) from S
Compute ca
ε
i for all i ∈ {1 . . .N1} and ε = ±1
if ca
ε
i = b then output inverse of aεix and stop
Save (|ca
ε
i |, ca
ε
i , aεix) in S
′
end for
After all conjugation attempts, sort S′ by the first element of every tuple
Copy the smallest M elements into S and delete the rest of S′
end while
Otherwise, output FAIL
Note that the ai, b
′, b¯′, and N1 are from the AAG protocol exchange in Section
3.1, while c¯′ is a candidate conjugator set. The length of a conjugator set c¯′ =
(c1, . . . , cj) is defined as
∑
j |cj |.
4.2. Linear Decomposition Attack. In [32], Miasnikov and Roman’kov intro-
duced the linear decomposition attack. The attack is a general framework for the
cryptanalysis of a number of group-theoretic analogues of Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change. For a protocol to be susceptible to the attack its platform groups must
admit a linear representation. Moreover, the algorithmic security assumption of
the protocol must be equivalent to commutative linear transformations. Note that
the AAG protocol is not susceptible to this attack.
Given the linear structure V and subsets W ≤ V and U ≤ End(V ), the attack
first computes a basis for the span of all vectors of the form wu, with w ∈ W and
u ∈ 〈U〉. This can be done in polynomial time with respect to the dimension of V
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and the sizes of W and U . This calculation can be performed offline if the platform
group for a particular protocol is fixed. The public group elements transmitted
during the key exchange can then be decomposed using this basis to reconstruct
the shared secret without discovering the private information of each party, negating
the need for an attacker to solve the underlying security problem.
The attack requires the platform group to be specified by either its linear rep-
resentation V (as a vector space or an associative algebra) or by a presentation
coupled with a faithful embedding into GL(V ). Moreover, the linear space into
which the group is embedded must be of sufficiently small dimension to make the
attack tractable. While the dimension of the smallest linear embeddings of fi-
nite groups and some classes of infinite groups such as torsion-free nilpotent and
polycyclic-by-finite are known, the authors concede that no such bounds are known
for other linear groups, including general polycyclic groups and metabelian groups.
4.3. Field-Based Attack. Kotov and Ushakov [26] investigated the security of
the AAG key-exchange protocol used with certain polycyclic groups of the form
GF = OF ⋊UF , where OF is the maximal order and UF is the unit group generated
by an irreducible polynomial in the algebraic number field F . In the semidirect
product, UF acts on OF by right multiplication. These groups were the original
polycyclic platform groups suggested by Eick and Kahrobaei in [10]. In [14], Garber,
Kahrobaei, and Lam showed that such groups were resistant to the length-based
attack, with the attack’s success decreasing as the Hirsch length of the group GF
increased.
Contrary to these results, the field-based attack devised by the authors is able to
recover the shared key regardless of the group’s Hirsch length. Using a determin-
istic, polynomial time algorithm, the key is recovered by solving a linear system of
conjugacy equations over the field F . If the group GF is specified as a semidirect
product and F is given in matrix form, the attack can be directly applied. How-
ever, if GF is given by a polycyclic presentation, the authors construct a linear
representation from the presentation prior to recovering the shared key.
While the field-based attack is successful in these particular groups, the authors
concede that their attack does not preclude other polycyclic groups from consid-
eration for the AAG protocol. We claim that there are other classes of polycyclic
groups that are resistant to such an attack. Such platform groups would be speci-
fied by their polycyclic presentations and have matrix representations that are not
readily computable.
4.4. Quotient Attack. In attempting to recover the shared secret from the public
information of the AAG protocol, the length-based attack (LBA) operates as if the
platform group G is a free group. The success of the LBA on non-free groups
motivated Miasnikov and Ushakov in [34] to investigate the asymptotic properties
of the given platform groups. Ultimately they determined that the LBA is successful
for groups in which a random choice of elements is very likely to generate a free
subgroup of G.
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These investigations led to a new form of attack for the AAG key exchange
protocol and others that use some variation of the membership or conjugacy search
problems. Dubbed the quotient attack, the algorithms solve the search problems
in a quotient group G/N . If G/N possesses the exponentially-generic free basis
property the solution in the quotient will yield one in the original group. The time
complexity of the attack is contingent upon the particular class of platform groups.
For pure braid groups PBn the authors prove that the complexity is O(n
2).
As polycyclic groups do not possess the free basis property nor any free sub-
groups, this attack is not applicable.
4.5. Linear Centralizer Attack. Tsaban [44] devised the linear centralizer attack
against AAG over the original braid group platform. The attack exploits a faithful
linear representation of a braid group Bn. Using this representation, the algorithm
computes a basis for the double centralizer of the public subsets of the AAG protocol
(which are contained in their respective double centralizers). This process produces
one half of the shared key, after which random elements are tested to find an inverse
that yields the other half. The algorithm runs in expected polynomial time with
respect to n, but is impractical for even modest values of n.
The applicability of the linear centralizer attack to other platform groups is
limited to those whose faithful representations are known and whose linear repre-
sentations are sufficiently small. As mentioned previously with respect to the linear
decomposition attack, these aspects of polycyclic groups are currently unknown.
5. Conclusion
. In this paper we have presented a survey of over ten years of research related
to polycyclic group-based cryptography. We began with a study of the algorith-
mic properties of polycyclic groups. Polycyclic groups admit a number of repre-
sentations, including polycyclic presentations, multiplication polynomials, and as
matrices. In addition to the decidability of the classic decision problems of word,
conjugacy, and isomorphism, the twisted conjugacy and orbit problem are also de-
cidable. Moreover, the conjugacy decision problem for the automorphism group
Aut(G) of a polycyclic group G is decidable.
. We have seen that there are a variety of key exchanges, digital signature systems,
and secret sharing schemes for which a polycyclic group is an appropriate choice
of platform group. These schemes use several different computational problems in
polycyclic groups as listed in the paper, which are beyond use of conjugacy search
problem.
. While there has been considerable research activity concerning polycyclic groups
and their attendant cryptosystems over the last decade, many computational com-
plexity and algorithmic questions remain unanswered. We have collected these
outstanding problems below, with the hope of stimulating interest in their solu-
tions:
(1) What is the complexity of the isomorphism search problem in polycyclic
groups?
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(2) What is the complexity of the twisted search conjugacy problem in poly-
cyclic groups?
(3) What is the complexity of the power conjugacy problem in polycyclic
groups?
(4) What is the complexity of the geodesic length problem in polycyclic groups?
(5) What is the complexity of the n-root problem in polycyclic groups?
(6) What is the complexity of finding matrix representation of polycyclic groups?
(7) What is the complexity of the conjugacy problem in the automorphism of
polycyclic groups?
(8) What is the complexity of the search endomorphism (automorphism) prob-
lem in polycyclic groups?
(9) What is the complexity of the homomorphism problem in polycyclic groups?
(10) Are polycyclic group-based cryptosystems resistant to quantum algorithms?
(11) What is the complexity of the subgroup membership search problem in
polycyclic groups?
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